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ticulars. In State v. Gould37 the supreme court upheld a trial
court's refusal to grant particulars after the prosecutor had
informed the court that he was not in a position to furnish the
particulars because of the manner in which the books had been
kept by the defendant.
CONCLUSIONS

Generalizations are misleading in an area of law so dependent upon the discretion of the trial judge as he views the facts
and circumstances of the individual case. However, certain broad
propositions emerge from a multitude of cases. First, when the
long form indictment or information is employed, the defendant
is entitled to such additional particulars as are necessary to
apprise him of the charge against him so that he may adequately
prepare his defense. Second, in the case of the short form indictment the defendant has a general right to a bill of particulars,
but this right is subject to certain very practical limitations. The
bill of particulars cannot be used to force the state to disclose
specific evidence, or to abandon a responsive verdict. Neither
can it be used as a dilatory tactic by requiring an enumeration
of useless particulars or of conclusions of law. Finally, the state
cannot be expected to perform the impossible, that is, to furnish
particulars it does not have.
James A. Hobbs

Labor Law-Applicability of United States
Arbitration Act' to Collective
Bargaining Agreements
Since the recent decision of the United States Cohrt of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Motor Coach Employees v.
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 2 quickly followed by Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Motor Coach Employees,3 a different
37. 155 La. 639, 99 So. 490 (1924).

1. 43 Stat. 883, 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. (1925).
2. 192 F. 2d 310 (3rd Cir. 1951).

3. 193 F. 2d 327 (3rd Cir. 1952). Plaintiff employer brought suit against
defendant union for breach of no strike agreement. The district court had
granted a stay of proceedings pending arbitration according to the collective

bargaining agreement. The third circuit reversed the order and remanded
the case in order that it might be proceeded with. It merely affirmed its
position taken in Motor Coach Employees v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,

192 F. 2d 310 (3rd Cir. 1951),
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case, there is no longer any serious dispute as to whether the
United States Arbitration Act is applicable to collective bargaining agreements. All the circuits which have decided this question are now in accord that it is not applicable. However, it is
the purpose of the writer to question the validity of the position
taken, both legally and from the standpoint of, sound public
policy.
THE ACT IN BRIEF

It is essential to an understanding of the jurisprudence to
bear in mind the pertinent provisions of the act. Section 1 defines
maritime transactions and commerce; further, it provides that
"nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in .

.

. commerce."

Section 2 declares that written

provisions "in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce" to arbitrate controversies
''arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable." Section 3 provides for a stay of
proceedings if "any issue referable to arbitration" has not been
arbitrated according to "an agreement in writing for such arbitration." Section 4 provides for judicial enforcement of written
agreements to arbitrate. There is very little helpful legislative
history except that it is obvious Congress intended to make written agreements to arbitrate enforceable in commerce and maritime transactions but not in contracts of employment.
THE JURISPRUDENCE

With this brief sketch of the pertinent provisions of the act
in mind, it is appropriate to examine the jurisprudence interpreting the act as it relates to collective bargaining agreements.
The third circuit had consistently held until recently 4 that Section 3, providing for a stay of proceedings, was applicable to such
agreements. The assumption was made without further ado that
a collective bargaining agreement was a contract of employment.
Yet the third circuit reasoned that Congress, in providing for
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, was dealing with subject
matter (maritime and commerce transactions) over which it had
the power to enact substantive law, whereas in Section 3, providing for a stay of proceedings, it was legislating under its power
to regulate procedure in the federal courts. Consequently Section
3 should be given a broad construction, not limited by other
4. 192 F. 2d 310 (3rd Cir. 1951),
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sections of the act, covering any issue referable to arbitration
under a written agreement for such arbitration in any suit
brought in the federal courts.5
However, since its recent decisions in the Motor Coach Employees cases, 6 the third circuit is now well settled to the effect
that the act is not applicable in any wise to collective bargaining
agreements. The reason for this change of view was that the
following catchline inserted by the compilers of the United
States Code at the beginning of Section 1, "'maritime transactions' and 'commerce' defined; exceptions to operation of title"
(italics supplied) had been enacted into positive law.7 The court
concluded that "exceptions to operation of title" meant what it
said and that therefore the act was not applicable to collective
bargaining agreements. The court further adopted the view that
the excepting clause dealing with contracts of employment included collective bargaining contracts. Thus the third circuit is
now in accord with the second," fourth 9 and sixth 0 circuits
which have taken this view all along.
5. Donahue v. Susquehana Collieries Co., 188 F. 2d 3 (3rd Cir. 1943). Plaintiff employees sued for back wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
A stay of proceedings was granted, since arbitration was provided for in the
collective agreement but had not taken place. Accord: Watkins v. Hudson
Coal Co., 151 F. 2d 311 (3rd Cir. 1945), cert. denied 327 U.S. 777 (1946), a suit
for overtime wages and damages.
See also the third circuit district court case of Metal Polishers, Buffers,
Platers & Helpers International Union Local No. 90, A.F. of L. v. Rubin,
85 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1949). A stay of proceedings was not granted;
however, the court found the issue was not referable to arbitration.
6. 192 F. 2d 310 (3rd Cir. 1951), 193 F. 2d 327 (3rd Cir. 1952).
7. Act of July 30, 1947, c. 392, § 1, 61 Stat. 669 (1947), 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 et
seq. (1947).
8. See Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers, Building &
Common Laborers Union of America, Local Union No. 210, 182 F. 2d 806
(2d Cir. 1950). Plaintiff company brought suit against defendant union under
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act for damages resulting
from a work stoppage; the collective bargaining agreement provided for
arbitration before any cessation of work. The court refused to grant a
stay of proceedings because the arbitration act was not applicable to
collective bargaining agreements. However, it is noteworthy that the arbitration agreement was given some effect in that the court gave damages for
violation of the collective bargaining agreement.
9. See International Union United Furniture Workers of America v.
Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., Inc. (United States Intervenor), 168 F. 2d
33 (4th Cir. 1948). Plaintiff employer sued defendant union under Section 301
of the' Labor Management Relations Act for damages resulting from a
strike allegedly in violation of the collective bargaining agreement which
contained an arbitration provision. A stay of proceedings was not granted;
the court said that the arbitration agreement did not cover strikes and
further that the arbitration act was not applicable to collective bargaining
agreements because the excepting clause in Section 1 applied to the
entire act.
10. See Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F. 2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944). Plaintiff
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It is interesting to 'note that the second circuit has, however,
gixen some effect to the agreement to arbitrate by giving damages under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act11
for violation of the arbitration provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. However, damages would have to be proved as
in any suit with the result that only nominal damages might be
12
awarded.
The tenth circuit, in Mercury Oil Refining Company v. Oil
Workers1 also held in accord with the other circuits. The court
said, in refusing to enforce arbitration, that Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act merely gave federal courts
jurisdiction over labor contracts and that it did not grant any
additional power to enforce agreements to arbitrate.
Three district court cases are noteworthy because of their
inconsistency with the circuit court decisions. United Office
Workers v. Monumental Life Insurance Company14 involved a
dispute between the union and the company over the checkoff
provision in the collective bargaining agreement which also contained an arbitration provision. There the court not only granted
a stay order but it directed the company to proceed with arbitration. The granting of the stay order was in line with the third
circuit's view; however, the enforcement of the arbitration agreement under Section 4 was the most liberal interpretation ever
given the act. The court sidestepped the question of whether or
not Section 4 was limited by the excepting clause in Section 1,
dealing with contracts of employment, and based its decision on
the grounds that that question was of no consequence because a
collective bargaining agreement is not a contract of employment.
In Lewittes v. FurnitureWorkers15 the district court granted
a stay of proceedings where plaintiff employer sued defendant
union under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
for breach of the collective bargaining agreement which contained an arbitration provision. This is of course inconsistent
employee brought suit against his employer for overtime compensation under
the Fair Labor Standards Act. A stay of proceedings was not granted because
the excepting clause in Section 1 was held to apply to the entire act including Section 3, providing for a stay of proceedings.
11. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 141 et seq., § 185 (1947).
12. Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers, Building & Common
Laborers Union of America, Local Union No. 210, 182 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950).
13. 187 F. 2d 980 (10th Cir. 1951).
14. 88 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
15, 95 F. Supp. 851 (S.D. N.Y. 1951),
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with what the second circuit specifically said in Shirley-Herman
Company v. Hod Carriers,16 that is, that the act was not applicable to collective agreements.
In the other of the three, Textile Workers v. Aleo Manufacturing Company,'7 the court granted a preliminary injunction to
compel defendant employer to comply with the arbitration clause
of the collective bargaining agreement. This was specific enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate; the court based its jurisdiction on Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act.' This decision does
not seem to be in line with the fourth circuit's decision in the
ColoniaL Hardwood Flooring Company case, 19 wherein the court
said the arbitration act was not applicable to collective bargaining agreements, implying that there could be no stay of proceedings or enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate; in that
case the action was also brought under Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act. However, it was distinguished on
the grounds that the arbitration agreement in the Colonial Hardwood Flooring Company case did not cover the matter in dispute
whereas the one before it did. The writer submits that, from a
full reading of both cases, the distinction is not too forceful.
Of course the United Office Workers case2o can now be deemed
overruled by the third circuit's decisions in the Motor Coach
Employees cases.21 However, the other two district court cases,
the Lewittes case 22 and the Textile Workers case 28 decided in
the second and fourth circuits respectively, were apparently intended to be in accord with the position taken by those respective
circuits. The Textile Workers case presents an interesting new
angle-that of specific enforcement under Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act. An appeal from either of these
three decisions would certainly put to test the stand now taken
by all the circuits.
CONCLUSION
Uniformity and certainty in themselves are desirable; however, the writer submits that this question, though settled, has
16. 182 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950).
17. 94 F. Supp. 626 (1950).

18. 62 Stat. 964, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201, 2202 (1949).
19. 168 F. 2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948).

20. 88 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
21. 192 F. 2d 310 (3rd Cir. 1951), 193 F. 2d 327 (3rd Cir. 1952).
22. 95 F. Supp. 851 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).

23. 94 F. Supp. 626 (1950).
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not been settled in accordance with the meaning of the act or
with sound public policy. The position taken by all the circuits
that the excepting clause in Section 1 is applicable to and limits
the entire act is not difficult to agree with. The view, however,
that the excepting clause covering contracts of employment
includes collective bargaining agreements is most difficult to
accept. A collective bargaining agreement is simply not a contract of employment. As was ably put by the Supreme Court
in Case Company v. National Labor Relations Board,24 "Contracts
in labor law is a term the implications of which must be determined from the connection in which it appears. Collective bargaining between employer and representatives of a unit, usually
a union, results in an accord as to terms which will govern hiring
and work and pay in that unit. The result is not, however, a
contract of employment except in rare cases; no one has a job by
reason of it and no obligation to any individual ordinarily comes
into existence from it alone. The negotiations between union
and management result in what has often been called a trade
agreement, rather than in a contract of employment. Without
pushing the analogy too far, the agreement may be likened to
the tariffs established by a carrier, to standard provisions prescribed by supervising authorities for insurance policies, or to
utility schedules of rates and rules for service, which do not of
themselves establish any relationships." 25 A collective bargaining agreement may be analogized to a constitution; it is a broad
agreement between an employer and a union, not an employee,
in which the rights, duties, and liabilities of the employer and
employees are outlined. It does not provide that a particular
person will be hired for a certain period of time for a specified
rate of pay. It provides for such things as a grievance procedure
in the event of a dispute between the employer and employee
or the union representing that employee. It provides that the
rate of pay for particular jobs will be within certain limits set
forth. It provides that employees will receive a certain period
of paid vacation depending on their seniority. It provides that
working conditions will be up to a certain standard. In many
respects, the lives of millions of laborers and their families are
affected just as much by collective bargaining agreements as they
are affected by the Constitution of the United States.
Was there any congressional intent or public policy against
24. 321 U.S. 332 (1944),

25. Id. at 334, 335,
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enforcing agreements to arbitrate in collective bargaining agreements? To the contrary, it would seem that sound policy would
sanction the enforcement of such agreements, that is, if sound
public policy is in favor of stable labor-management relationships. This view was taken in the United Office Workers case
and in the Lewittes case which, as has been pointed out, are not
in line with the jurisprudence. It would be most interesting to
see how the Supreme Court would decide the question in the
event that it granted certiorari.
The result reached in the Textile Workers case is novel. It
seems to be settled that damages may be given under Section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act. The writer submits
that performance as well may be granted under Section 301, as
was done in the Textil Workers case. This act deals solely with
labor-management relations and it should not be limited in the
scope of its application by an act passed twenty-two years prior
and not dealing with such relationships. Section 301 (a) provides that suits for violations of contracts between an employer
and a union may be brought in the United States district courts.
Section 301 (b) makes certain provisions in the event of a money
judgment against a union; this would seem to imply that Section
301 is not limited solely to suits for damages; the Textile Workers
case represents to the writer the correct and intended application
of the Labor Management Relations Act, leaving out any consideration of the arbitration act. Specific enforcement of agreements
to arbitrate under Section 301 might be a way around a decision
on the question of the arbitration act's applicability to collective
bargaining agreements in the event that the Supreme Court ever
grants certiorari on that question.
It is necessary to note at this point that the granting of specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate might be contrary
to the Norris LaGuardia Act, 26 since that act prohibits the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes. While there is some authority to this effect, the point was urged and rejected in the Textile
Workers case. This possibility involves many complex issues
dealing with statutory interpretation and policy. These have
been ably discussed by Professor William G. Rice, Jr., in a recent
27
issue of the Marquette Law Review.
26. 47 Stat. 90, 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq. (1932).
27. A Paradox of our National Labor Law, 34 Marquette L. Rev. 233
(1951).
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It should be noted that the significance of the present position taken by the circuit courts in denying applicability of the
United States Arbitration Act to collective bargaining agreements is lessened because of the fact that there are corhparatively few breaches between labor and management of agreements to arbitrate and the fact that the courts will award
damages for such breaches.
William A. L. Crowe

Torts-Recovery by Aggressor for Personal

Injuries Received in Encounter
Article 23151 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 is the
general tort article, and as such is the ultimate foundation of
the action wherein a party seeks recovery for personal injuries
received in an encounter with a fellow. Because of this, article
recovery is predicated upon the finding of "fault." Thus, for
example, in LaFleur v. Dupre2 plaintiff, when held "not at
4
fault," 3 was allowed damages, and in Fontenefle v. Waguespack
it was concluded that "Either plaintiff or defendant, in order to
recover, would have to prove that he was without fault in provoking the difficulty." 5 In the dissenting opinion in Ogden v.
Thomas6 the plaintiff was held not entitled to recovery because he
was not "without fault." 7 Nevertheless the number of cases
wherein "fault" is mentioned is quite restricted, the probable reason for this being the formulation by the courts of what might
appropriately be called the "aggressor rule." 8
The "aggressor rule" is: One who provokes a difficulty
with another cannot recover damages for injuries inflicted upon
him as a result thereof, even though the conduct of the one who
1. "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another, obliges
him by whose fault it happened to repair it.
2. 41 So. 2d 717 (La. App. 1949).
3. Id. at 720.
4. 1 La. App. 230 (1924).
5. Id. at 232.
6. 150 La. 316, 90 So. 662 (1922).

7. 150 La. 316, 320, 90 So. 662, 663.
8. The "aggressor rule" itself received a "fault" transfusion in Randall v.
Ridgley, 185 So. 632 (La. App. 1939), wherein the court stated: ". . . one who
is himself in fault cannot recover damages for a wrong resulting from such
fault, although the party inflicting the injury was not justified under the law."

